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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2646 
___________ 
 
FIDEL ANTHONY NAPIER, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                  Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A037-774-466) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 8, 2014 
Before:  SMITH, KRAUSE and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 8, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Fidel Napier petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons detailed below, we will dismiss the 
petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.   
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 Fidel Napier is a citizen of Jamaica.  He entered the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in 1983, at the age of five.  In 1998, he was convicted of possession of a controlled 
dangerous substance with the intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7.  As a result, in 2010, the Department of Homeland Security charged 
him with being removable as an alien who had been convicted of a controlled-substance 
violation, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and an aggravated felony, see § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   
 Before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Napier conceded that his crime qualified as a 
controlled-substance offense; he disputed whether his conviction constituted an aggravated 
felony, but the IJ ruled against him.  Napier sought relief under the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT).  He testified that his stepfather, Darrell Norton, had assisted local police and 
DEA agents in operations targeting Jamaican-born gang members in Camden, New Jersey.  
Based in part on Norton’s efforts, several men were incarcerated and deported to Jamaica.  
Napier and Norton testified that these men or their confederates would harm Napier in Jamaica 
in retaliation for Norton’s conduct.   
 The IJ denied relief to Napier, and he appealed to the BIA.  The BIA dismissed the 
appeal, concluding that Napier had failed to present sufficient evidence to obtain CAT relief.  
More specifically, the BIA concluded that, given that it had been 17 years since Norton had 
assisted law enforcement, that Napier had never been threatened, and that Napier and Norton 
did not share a surname, Napier had failed to show that these gang members would be able to 
recognize him and would be motivated to harm him.  Further, the BIA ruled that Napier had 
failed to establish that any harm would occur with the Jamaican government’s consent or 
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acquiescence.  Napier filed a timely petition for review to this Court.   
 We generally have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of removal.  
However, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any 
final order of removal against an alien who is removable for having been convicted of violating 
a law relating to a controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).”  Rojas v. Att’y 
Gen., 728 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).  Napier does not 
(and cannot) dispute that his conviction under New Jersey law for possessing with the intent to 
distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school qualifies as a state law “relating to a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).”  See id. at 217-20 (providing standards 
governing this inquiry).  Accordingly, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing constitutional 
claims and questions of law.  See § 1252(a)(2)(D).   
 In his brief, Napier argues first that the BIA erred in concluding that he had failed to 
meet his burden of proving that individuals in Jamaica would attempt to harm him.  However, 
this represents the type of factual finding that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review.  See 
Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  While Napier occasionally claims 
that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard, it is apparent that he is actually arguing that 
the agency improperly weighed the evidence.  See, e.g., Br. at 21 (arguing that the country-
conditions evidence “was given insufficient weight”); Br. at 23 (arguing that the agency should 
not have accorded any weight to the fact that stepfather’s interaction with gang members had 
ceased 17 years ago).  These are factual questions over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.  See 
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (claim that the agency “incorrectly 
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weighed evidence” is not a question of law); see also Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 233 
(3d Cir. 2010) (noting that “[a]lthough [alien] claims to be challenging the IJ's misapplication 
of a legal standard, she is actually asserting that she met her burden,” which “does not present 
a constitutional question or a question of law”).1  
 Napier also challenges the BIA’s ruling that he failed to show that the individuals whom 
he fears are either public officials or persons who would act with the government’s consent or 
acquiescence.  This argument is also beyond our jurisdiction to review.  See Green v. Att’y 
Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507 (3d Cir. 2012); Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 343 n.12 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Napier contends that “the Board clearly committed a legal error when it found that 
there was not sufficient evidence of public official involvement or willful blindness,” but, as 
we explained above, this is merely a factual argument in legal clothing.  See, e.g., Conteh v. 
Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 63 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that jurisdictional bar “extends to review 
of the BIA’s factual findings as to credibility, evidentiary weight, and satisfaction of a 
correctly framed burden of proof”).   
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review.  
 
 
 
                                              
1 At one point, Napier alleges that, contrary to our decision in Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 
463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003), the BIA required him to establish that his potential torturers had the 
specific intent to harm him.  While this could theoretically amount to a legal argument, the 
BIA imposed no such requirement; rather, it merely examined “what is likely to happen to the 
petitioner if removed,” which, we have held, is a factual question.  Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 271.  
(The argument is also misplaced.  See Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(en banc) (“the CAT requires a showing of specific intent”).) 
